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Much has been made of a possible Sino-Russian alliance 
across military and economic aspects crowding out US influ-
ence in Asia. Politicians and academics afraid of such an alli-
ance cite recent UN voting records, where their interests seem 
to converge against US desires such as in Iran or Syria, or the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) formation to fos-
ter military and economic cooperation looking to push out US 
interests, or cooperation in Central Asia. However, these fears 
are overblown. China is holding Russia close in order to pro-
vide itself with more room to grow. Sino-Russo cooperation is 
merely a smoke-screen masking underlying tensions that will 
emerge over the next 5-10 years. 
History of Cooperation
China and Russia’s shared history begins back in the late 16th 
century, but was only solidified in the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 
1689. The Treaty of Nerchinsk was the first treaty in which 
China recognized the other signatory as their equal. Up until 
very recently, “the great distance between the main population 
and manufacturing areas of the two countries [kept] the trade 
potential between them lower than such a long common bor-
der might otherwise imply.” The relationship has always been 
rocky. However, it was exacerbated by Russia’s participation in 
the “unequal treaties” during the Qing dynasty as well as dif-
ficulties during the Soviet era. China resented Russia’s posture 
as the ‘know all,’ as well as their refusal to share technology 
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with the other communist states. Russia shipped technology 
and arms but not the instructions on how to use those items. 
In addition, China felt the Soviet Union under Khrushchev 
was revisionist and going away from the communist perfec-
tion of the Stalin years. Currently China and Russia have a 
“Strategic Partnership” through their Treaty of Neighborliness 
and Friendly Cooperation that contains many elements of an 
alliance, but which both sides carefully point out is not an al-
liance. Examples include their agreement that they shall not 
enter any alliance without the others knowledge or undermine 
each other interests.
When thinking of the UN Security Council, a common refrain 
is the US-Russia split, where Russia and China often veto or 
abstain from votes the US deems crucial. Some view the vot-
ing behavior as symptomatic of a larger Sino-Russo rejection 
of international norms and behaviors showcasing a deeper 
revisionist desire. It is more likely representative of a desire 
to thwart American ambitions than a nefarious dismissal of 
the current global system. Russia’s elites see recent Western 
expansionist moves as detrimental to Russia’s national inter-
ests.  However, the abstaining votes are more indicative of 
China’s “wait and see” diplomacy, which advocates for quietly 
learning about multi-lateral diplomacy and only being active 
if China’s interests are affected. As Shambaugh (2013) points 
out “Both [countries] share strong opposition to coercion and 
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the use of force in international affairs, and both cherish 
state sovereignty as the most basic principle of diplomacy.” 
These interests have coincided with a more active American 
foreign policy, including two wars in their backyard, which 
increased their worries and anti-American rhetoric.  
Comparing the two countries provides interesting results, 
especially when contrasted with the United States. Table one 
presents a few economic statistics.  While Russia’s economy 
is only 24.5% the size of China’s, their GDP per capita is more 
than double. In 2013, Brenton, an area specialist, predicted 
that by 2030, Russia’s GDP will be less than 14% of China’s. 
Both countries are high savers, but Russia has been recently 
declining while China is still increasing its savings rate.  For 
both China and Russia their relationship with the West is 
more important than their relationship with each other. 
The last two decades were an important aspect of bilateral 
Russia-Chinese cooperation; between 2000 and 2010, Rus-
sia’s annual exports to China quadrupled and China’s to Rus-
sia rose by 20 times.  According to Ferdinand, another econ-
omist,, the importance of bilateral trade is actually declining 
between the two. Yet, Brenton disagrees, arguing that China 
is now a key trading partner for Russia, but Russia is a mar-
ginal trading partner for China (having less than 2% of both 
exports and imports). 
Significance of Cooperation
China’s and Russia’s interpretation of their cooperation is 
vastly different. Brenton  argues that China sees Russia as an 
unreliable partner due to its unpredictability and poor qual-
ity of internal governance. For China, the relationship with 
Russia provides them with a stable neighborhood as well as 
a convenient source for raw materials. For Russia, they in-
creasingly see Chinese workers as a threat. In addition, Rus-
sia sees opportunity in China to diversify supply away from 
Europe for gas and raw materials. Russia is less concerned 
about the internal governance of China.
Both Russia and China are dedicated to Central Asian sta-
bility. Both promote a form of state dominance in what has 
been called an Axis of Authoritarianism. In addition, they 
created the SCO to enhance their mutual influence in Cen-
tral Asia at the expense of the U.S. Yet the SCO is not all 
cooperation. It is Central Asia where China and Russia have 
the best opportunity to work together to keep the Central 
Asian economies focused mostly on raw material supply 
rather than industrialize to compete with China or Russia. 
However, while Russia wants to follow this path by working 
to keep the Central Asian economies reliant on Russia, Chi-
na has invested heavily in the region’s infrastructure in order 
to benefit their adjoining provinces. 
For the US, the possibility of a Sino-Russo alliance is ex-
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tremely worrying. The first threat emanates from Russian and 
Chinese support for regimes in Syria and Iran, and other au-
thoritarian regimes like North Korea. These regimes are dan-
gerous to the region and the world through state sponsored 
terrorism, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and non-mili-
tary threats such as disease spreading. China’s and Russia’s be-
lief in non-intervention, have let these conflicts to grow faster 
than the US can respond. 
In addition, through the P5+1, the permanent members of the 
UN Security Council plus Germany,, they have both been in-
fluential in Iran; even while China continues to thwart inter-
national sanctions against Iran. If the two countries cooperate 
and become even more revisionist, they would be in a better 
position than ever before to cause problems for the U.S. Yet 
the opposite is also true; if they are more conforming than ex-
pected it will be a boost for the international order. There are 
signs this is beginning to occur. Ikenberry, a world renowned 
economist, argues that China and Russia are “part time spoil-
ers” rather than full scale revisionist powers. 
Outlook of Cooperation
Russia and China’s version of state sponsored economic growth 
is attractive to aging pseudo-dictators in the Eurasian region, 
or for those who want to stay in power and keep gathering cor-
rupt rents. In addition, for many in Eurasia, exports or remit-
tances from Russia and China represent a large portion of their 
income. As Jeffery Reaves, a professor at the Asia Pacific Center 
for Security Studies, shows, the states have adopted very differ-
ent ways of coping with the rise of China: institutionalizing 
dissent and making laws against Chinese investment or rheto-
ric. However, many states are turning from rhetoric to enacting 
policy changes against China. Towards Russia, Central Asian 
states have had three reactions to coercive Russian energy di-
plomacy: compliance, defiance, or mutual accommodation.
The majority of states in the region welcome Chinese invest-
ment in their infrastructure. Russia is attractive for the subsi-
dized gas prices it offers to many countries. If China and Russia 
were able to cooperate they could co-opt what influence the 
US has in Central Asia. Even with the drawdown in Afghan-
istan, the region remains important to US interests. Accord-
ing to Jeffery Mankoff, Deputy Director and Fellow at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies,, “The region’s 
principal threats emanate from domestic governance prob-
lems and weak state institutions that heighten the possibil-
ity of political instability, and the region’s two largest states, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, face uncertain succession chal-
lenges for leadership that date back to the Soviet period.”
In the short term the US can expect an increase in coopera-
tion between China and Russia due to raw materials supply 
and China’s risk adverse diplomacy. However, subterfuge is 
also expected. China will slowly be increasing its stake in 
Central Asia at Russia’s expense. So far, Russia has accepted 
Chinese investment as a good thing, but its anxiety is grow-
ing. In the long term, there will be a diplomatic split. Russia 
will become increasingly uncomfortable with China’s pres-
ence in Central Asia. China will become increasing both-
ered by Russia’s incursions to its neighbors sovereign space. 
China disagreed with Russia’s invasion of both Georgia and 
Ukraine. If Russia does not formulate an effective policy 
against China’s economic growth, and deal with its own 
internal corruption problems, it risks losing market share 
globally. Russia also risks simply becoming a supplier of raw 
materials. China would emerge as a “winner” who is able to 
directly challenge US influence not only in Central Asia, but 
in the world at large. 
Conclusion
The fears of a Sino-Russo world order sensationalized in 
news reports are not based in fact. While both countries are 
increasing their bilateral trade, as well as coordinating trade 
in Central Asia, it is more indicative of narrow self-interest 
rather than a desire to overthrow the liberal world order. 
China and Russia have a turbulent, but shared, history that 
positions them as counterweight to U.S. global hegemony. 
However, they still cannot compete with the US’s economic 
or military might.  Their ‘Axis of Authoritarianism’ is attrac-
tive to leaders who want a stronger role for the state, but it is 
unlikely to change the current world order. 
Still, the possibility of a deeper alliance is problematic for 
the US, as Russia and China are uniquely positioned to 
counter US activity in their regions of the world. While co-
operation may increase over the short run, it most likely fall 
apart. The US will not have to fear an extensive Sino-Russo 
cooperation for long.
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